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Introduction
Not for a few decades has there been a greater level of
concern about New Zealand’s longer-term energy future,
and the interplay between energy issues and climate
change issues. In particular, energy issues continue to
vex many New Zealanders, not least those facing the
prospect of new electricity transmission pylons south
of Auckland, energy users worried about supply
shortages over the next winter, and vehicle drivers facing
another oil price increase as crude oil in world markets
hovers around US$70 per barrel. At the same time,
concerns about climate change are intensifying, with
some arguing that New Zealand government policy
advisers and ministers have failed to grasp the magnitude
of this issue. Currently, advisers are exploring new
climate change policy instruments, following the
government’s decision to drop the carbon tax which had
been scheduled for introduction in April 2007.
Issues of energy insecurity, peak oil and climate change
were all identified in the government’s Sustainable Energy
document of October 2004; what is surprising, even
taking into account the discontinuity of the 2005
election, is the lack of progress on them since 2004. A
positive sign, however, is the reference in the November
2005 Speech from the Throne, where it was stated that
‘the Government would in this term explore a wide range
of potential energy scenarios, in order to develop a
National Energy Strategy’.
Leaving aside some lower-profile research contributions
(e.g. Sims et al., 2005; Ministry of Economic
Development, 2003; Chapman et al., 2003), two key
recent documents have begun such an exploration,
sketching out paths to a range of energy futures. They
are the New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable
Development’s document, A Sustainable Energy Future
for New Zealand by 2050: a business view (September
2005) and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the
Environment’s Future Currents: electricity scenarios for
New Zealand 2005-2050 (July 2005). We review the
approaches taken and conclusions reached in the two
documents. In doing so, we emphasise the strong
connections between energy and climate change policy
for New Zealand. We give more space to the Business
Council’s document simply because, covering energy
as a whole, it takes a rather wider view than the
Parliamentary Commissioner’s document, which focuses
only on electricity.
What does the Business Council
document do?
The Business Council (BCSD) document scans the
wider energy sector, and in so doing provides a well-
researched account of perspectives of interest to the
business sector. It starts from the hypothesis of transition
– meaning that in 2050 New Zealand’s energy sector
will have a much more sustainable profile than we see
in that sector today. It also builds in a timeframe for the
decisions which have to be made in order to achieve
‘energy sustainability’ by that date.
The BCSD document aims to raise awareness within
the business sector of how the economy’s future demands
for energy could potentially be met in a more
environmentally sustainable way, if certain policies are
adopted. The analysis is cast at a headline level in terms
of achieving energy sustainability (which need not imply
environmental sustainability), but the text does in fact
put considerable weight on environmental goals.
The BCSD document uses a set of four scenarios to
explore possible energy future paths and reach certain
outcomes by 2050. It is less clear on the process that
might be followed in order to reach the outcomes,
although in its final paragraph (‘The Challenges Ahead’)
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it does assign a leadership role to government ‘in
ensuring that we keep our energy options open’.
The scenarios are focused around two main
dimensions: GDP growth and energy demand
growth. By focusing on these two dimensions, greater
and lesser degrees of decoupling (of economic growth
from energy demand) are explored. Decoupling of
economic growth from environmental impact, and
issues of energy security, are also explored (e.g.
reduced environmental impact occurs in those future
states where low energy demand is projected).
Although the two chosen dimensions of focus (GDP
and energy demand) are not the only possible two
dimensions to choose as the basis of energy scenarios,
they are undoubtedly important to New Zealand
business and to others. Other dimensions of
importance both to New Zealand business and to the
wider community, but only lightly sketched are
environmental sustainability, social/behavioural
change and ‘energy services’ (rather than energy
demand per se).
Strong points of the BCSD document
The BCSD report is valuable in a number of ways for
any dialogue about future energy paths.
First, the scenario approach helps the report’s audience
to visualise a number of future paths which the economy
and society could take, and underlines the key point
that strategic choices need to be made by both
government and the business sector.
Second, the report recognises the key issues of both ‘peak
oil’ and climate change. However, a view that ‘global
oil production will peak sometime over the next 50 years’
is too relaxed a view of this (Hirsch et al., 2005), and
the document also radically underestimates the
importance of early moves to decarbonise our energy
system (see below).
Third, the BCSD report recognises the importance of
maintaining system resilience and adaptability by not
closing options through poor decisions (i.e. providing
‘optionality’).
Fourth, it acknowledges that energy infrastructure
decisions made now have ramifications for many years
ahead. As the report states: ‘We made [at various points
in our history] large infrastructural decisions that set
the course of our energy use for years to come’ (p.5).
A corollary is that ‘Infrastructure investment risks are
high and mistakes have long-term costs’ (p.5). This
point is vital: the effective lifetime of our urban form,
for example, is more than 100 years, exceeding even
the lifetime of our hydro power stations. In economic
terms, there is major ‘path dependence’ in urban form
and other infrastructure decisions, which means that
we need to consider timeframes of at least 50 years
when investing in energy use or production
infrastructure. The likelihood that peak oil and climate
change will have fundamentally altered the energy
picture by then is very high.
Lastly, many of the BCSD’s recommendations make
sense; for example, that ‘the government needs to
understand what drives the acceptability and uptake of
energy and usage options in New Zealand’ (p.19). This
may sound obvious, but the empirical work has often
simply not been done to generate an adequate picture
of uptake and behaviour.
Gaps in the BCSD approach
Environmental sustainability
There is some welcome attention given to environmental
sustainability (see ‘Sustainability criteria assessment’ for
each scenario, pp.10-11), but the report in our view
radically underestimates the importance of climate
change to New Zealand’s energy future. Climate change
is factored in, but not adequately. For example, even
rough indications of future CO2 emission paths are not
provided. Undoubtedly, careful modelling of CO2
emissions would have been complex, but indicative
assessments would have been valuable, given the
importance of being able to assess scenarios in terms of
climate change policy contribution and policy risk.
The scenarios do acknowledge climate risks, but
underestimate the risk of New Zealand facing tight
constraints on energy choices due to climate change
developments. For example, it is stated that ‘New
Zealand may become constrained by the way we limit or
alter our use of fossil fuels to mitigate potential climate
change impacts’ (p.3, emphasis added). New Zealand
is already constrained by choices of fuels in the past
(e.g. use of Maui gas) and will very likely be heavily
constrained by climate change requirements in the
future. There is a substantial likelihood of New Zealand
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having to make deep reductions in fossil fuel use within
a decade, if climate change impacts accelerate or
projections become more alarming (e.g. Hansen, 2005),
unless we can find other ways to substantially cut our
greenhouse gas emissions.
Social/behavioural change
The BCSD report does not ignore the need for
behavioural change (‘we will require behavioural
change’, p.18), but it underplays it, at least in terms of
headline presentation, in favour of a stress on
technology (especially carbon capture and storage, or
CCS) and efficiency.
There is some implicit attention to changes in social
and behavioural patterns (e.g. under ‘How we live’, p.12;
in respect of both Conservation and Transformation
scenarios, pp.10-11, brief reference to affordability; and
p.19) but this tends to be overwhelmed by the focus on
technological change. This is captured in the statement
that ‘We can have high growth and environmental
standards only if technology developments are realised’
(p.14). This underplays the importance of behaviour
(and underlying attitudinal) change.
Similarly, the report’s approach does make some
connection between social outcomes and energy
demand (e.g. ‘demand will be an outcome of the type
of society we want to build’ (p.8)), but this is not
elaborated significantly. Moreover, the various
dimensions of social and behavioural change are not
explored in depth. It would have been helpful to see a
discussion of the relative scope for technological as
against social/behavioural change.
The report does acknowledge that this is a ‘gap’: it states
towards the end that ‘The focus of the scenario analysis
has been largely technical and economic’ (p.16).
However, it then draws a conclusion which is debatable;
that those scenarios which involve more rapid change
from ‘business as usual’ (i.e. the Transformation and
Conservation scenarios) suppose ‘changes in our society
which result in a general acceptance of more direction
about the way we use energy’ (emphasis added). This
remark might be interpreted as doubtful about the
acceptability of ‘direction’. However, substantial
behavioural change might follow from a judicious
combination of education, information and application
of (reasonable) economic incentives.
Energy services
The report is light on distinguishing the demand for
energy services from energy, yet this is an important
distinction if demand is to be fully analysed. There is a
reference (p.10) under the Transformation scenario
where it is stated that ‘change has been assisted by a
radical focus on the way New Zealand’s social and
transport needs are met’, but this is not elaborated.
Moreover, there is some detailing of transport energy
demand (p.12), but little discussion of adaptation (or
otherwise) of transport services.
Rather, the approach taken in the report is essentially
to distinguish a high rate of AEEI (autonomous energy
efficiency improvement) in two scenarios –
Transformation and Conservation – from a low rate in
the two other scenarios – Growth and Shielded. The
two AEEI rates assumed are 1.5% and 0.75%
respectively (p.8). While these rates are not implausible,
the approach is a ‘black box’ one - it is not evident what
evolution in energy service demands lie behind these
numbers. For this reason, the projections of energy
demand in 2050, especially the higher (‘business as
usual’-type) demand projections, should be seen as
indicative only.
Trade-off emphasis
A feature of the discussion on p.18 is the emphasis on
trade-offs (‘For a sustainable energy future we face
trade-offs between affordability, security of supply and
environmental protection’). This formulation is
repeated in the conclusion (p.20). This has some
immediate appeal – some hard choices will always be
necessary – but this particular trade-off does not
necessarily stand up. No compelling substantiation of
this trade-off is offered.
It can, on the contrary, be argued that in order to
maintain development in the longer term that can be
‘afforded’ in a broad sense, both environmental
protection and security of supply are vital. Without
investments in technology and behaviour change that
are socially and environmentally responsible, the
likelihood of ongoing sustainable development is
severely reduced. This requires a range of actions going
beyond mere ‘broadening’ (p.18) of renewables: a
dramatic uptake of available and new renewables is
needed, along with behavioural change, on a timescale
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that reflects the urgency of the climate change issue and
the need also to address peak oil.
In the context of maintaining ‘optionality’, it should be
noted that conventional solutions such as lumpy
investment in the national grid south of Auckland or in
the ‘top of the South’ may reduce optionality, as well as
being environmentally undesirable and possibly less
affordable than small-scale distributed generation.
Lumpy national grid investment may crowd out the
development of a multi-directional grid connecting
smaller-scale generating units. Moreover, the challenges
facing grid-constrained regions (and rural regions facing
disconnection post-2013) may well create opportunities
for new partnerships and institutional arrangements. An
example might be a public/private partnership in a
region such as the East Coast, investing in local resources
and using a new financial structure to achieve a broad
set of local objectives.
Assumptions in the BCSD report
A key underlying assumption made in the BCSD
analysis is that economic growth is fundamental and is
necessary for sustainability:
Growth is a fundamental requirement for
economic and social development. (p.1)
Part of this challenge [to shift to more sustainable
energy] will be to ensure that we have the
economic growth necessary to afford the changes
required. In other words, a sustainable energy
future will come from growth that in turn is
dependent on adequate supplies of affordable
energy. (p.3)
This assumption has some superficial basis in the
association between more rapid economic growth and
faster turnover of capital and take-up of energy efficiency.
But the connection is overly simplified; the ‘wrong’ sort
of growth (e.g. growth involving major urban expansion
or higher investment in energy-intensive sectors) may
make the required shift harder. Moreover, it would be
possible to achieve a combination of somewhat slower
economic growth and greater environmental
sustainability or, more positively, a modest but ‘sufficient’
rate of economic development associated with enhanced
sustainability (Daly, 2005). There is good evidence that
this mix is something which New Zealanders would
support (see Annex). Literature on the Environmental
Kuznets Curve also shows that there is a variety of future
states of economic development and environmental
sustainability that can be attained by developed
economies, depending on the mix of policies and
approaches adopted.
A second important assumption (or rather, set of
assumptions) relates to new technology development.
For example, the assumption that CCS (carbon capture
and storage) could move to commercial viability by 2025
(Growth scenario) seems optimistic. As noted in the
document, ‘Proven CCS technology is therefore critical
[to meeting climate change obligations].’ With CCS
being critical to the Growth scenario in this sense, that
scenario becomes particularly risky. To give due credit,
the report does note on p.15 that all the scenarios (except
Conservation) rely on CCS, ‘with Growth and Shielded
carrying the highest risk should CCS development be
either delayed or too costly’. The assumption of
increased CCS uptake from 2021 is ‘in line with the
earliest world view’ of demonstration, take-up and
availability. The extent of reliance on this risky
assumption could perhaps have been given more
prominence.
Conversely, a (third) assumption of technological
breakthroughs in renewables in the late 2020s is
probably too pessimistic, as may be the assumption that
smart grid technology would not be available before
2025 (p.15). For photovoltaic, wind and wave energy,
the document probably underestimates the impact that
technological advance will have on investment decisions
across both the public and private sectors, and at both
the corporate and individual/community levels. In
respect of the grid, there are some signs that innovative
solutions are closer than 20 years away.1 And Chinese
investment plans for new automobile technology suggest
that fuel cell vehicles may be available well before 2025
and are likely to be ‘widely available’ well before 2050
(cf. Figure 8, p.6).
A questionable fourth assumption is that, within the
Growth scenario, New Zealand would be able to meet
its climate change obligations. The assumption is stated
as: ‘New Zealand meets its climate change obligations
1 At the CAE workshop on Distributed Generation in June 2005, a
British expert indicated that it was not so much a question of new
technological breakthroughs being required to accommodate small,
intermittent generators close to the point of use, but rather of a
need for new software (at least in the UK).
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through relatively benign environmental pricing
instruments that provide assistance to renewable
energies’ (p.10). Given that energy prices remain low in
this scenario, and that renewables stagnate between 2010
and 2020, this outcome seems implausible.
Conversely, a fifth and major assumption relates to
the scope for carbon emission mitigation in the absence
of new technologies. The assumption that New
Zealand’s increased carbon emissions ‘will not be
mitigated until new technologies (e.g. CCS) or
alternative fuels (e.g. transport biofuels) become
available’ (p.16) is not defensible. It downplays the
potential for considerable further mitigation through
exploitation of other renewables, and behaviour
change/energy efficiency.
Lastly, various other assumptions in the report can be
debated. For example, it was not realistic in mid-2005
to assume (p.7) that petrol and diesel will be available
at 45-55 cents a litre (wholesale, presumably) until
somewhere between 2025 and 2050.
Conclusion on the BCSD report
Despite some limitations, the BCSD report is a
significant contribution to an enlightened dialogue on
energy futures. The emphases on sustainability and on
keeping options open in making a transition over the
period to 2050 represent real strengths in the document.
Some of the assumptions in the document (such as the
forces underlying the projected rates of growth in energy
demand) can be debated. Nonetheless, this document
does provide a useful framework for this dialogue
process. It also helps to underline the fact that there is a
range of views on the speed of technological and
behavioural change, so any future dialogue should draw
on a range of experts familiar with the factors which
can influence such change in various ways.
Moreover, the report’s conclusion that there is a role
for government in encouraging choices that are
sustainable is worth underlining. The report should
have gone further in creating a sense of urgency about
the need for environmentally sustainable investments,
particularly renewables and behaviour change in areas
such as sustainable transport, in the light of the
converging concerns of peak oil and climate change.
Nevertheless, the BCSD report is likely to have a
valuable impact in raising awareness within the
business sector of how the economy’s future demands
for energy could potentially be met in a more
environmentally sustainable way, if forward-looking
policies are adopted. To that end, it usefully
complements other recent publications, namely the
government’s Sustainable Energy framework document
and Future Currents, from the Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment (PCE).
What does the PCE document do?
Like the BCSD document, the PCE analysis, Future
Currents: Electricity Scenarios for New Zealand 2005-
2050, uses scenarios as a means to consider future energy
paths. Its focus, however, is on electricity rather than
the energy system as a whole. The PCE’s motivation
includes a sense that there has been a lack of futures
thinking and strategic planning for electricity and energy
issues at an official level in New Zealand since the 1980s.
In fact, the PCE report, focusing as it does on
environmental implications of trends and changes in
the electricity system, is the first of its kind.
The PCE report spells out two distinct scenarios from
now to 2050 –    Fuelling the Future and Sparking New
Designs. They highlight ‘how different our futures could
be, depending on the decisions we make’ (p.3). The
former relies on major infrastructure investment, while
the latter emphasises smart design to provide energy
services in efficient and innovative ways. Decision
making also tends to be more conservative in Fuelling
the Future, stressing shorter-term goals, the supply side
and the goal of low-cost electricity, while Sparking New
Designs emphasises longer-term goals, energy efficiency
as well as supply, and a focus on energy services rather
than low-cost electricity.
Strong points
The PCE report is accessible and engaging; it makes an
innovative effort to bring critical future energy path
issues to a wider audience. Its main method for doing
this is to explore two scenarios using the device of
perspectives from two fictional characters, Shane (‘down
on the farm’) and Robyn (‘city life’), who personalise
the scenarios. This makes the PCE report highly
readable. At the same time, the PCE report, like the
BCSD document, is clearly based on a large body of
work, including quantitative modelling, which underpin
the scenarios and ensure their internal consistency.
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The PCE approach
Although it is highly innovative and credible (indeed,
the Commissioner says in his preface that ‘Our scenarios
are conservative’), the PCE report is arguably too
optimistic in aspects of its Sparking New Designs
scenario. For example, it projects zero emissions (CO2)
from the electricity sector by 2050, on the basis that all
power generation is by then renewable. Underlying
assumptions include more hydro (e.g. 70 MW in
Marlborough) and geothermal (475 MW in the
Waikato), as well as more wind and much more solar
photovoltaic (1200 MW across New Zealand), and
markedly improved energy efficiency. The level of
photovoltaic penetration is highly dependent in turn
on the assumption of ‘very large’ cost reductions (p.24).
However, within the domain of scenario building, to
say that the Sparking New Designs scenario is too
optimistic is arguably not a valid criticism. After all, it
is important to choose a range of scenarios that bound
the domain of what is reasonably able to be envisaged
without having to suspend disbelief. If New Zealand
were lucky in terms of imported technology
breakthroughs in areas such as photovoltaics, then an
outcome of zero carbon emissions from electricity
could be attainable. It should be noted that such an
outcome could be expected to be accompanied by
markedly less pressure on energy prices generally, since
worldwide, photovoltaics could be expected to be
displacing fossil fuel use.
Sparking New Designs is best seen as a credible view of
the future at one end of the spectrum, the purpose of
which is to facilitate the process of taking the steps to
get from here to there - i.e. to aid the ‘backcasting’
process. Fuelling the Future, the alternative scenario, is
in this sense a characterisation of the sort of future we
may face if more enlightened policies are not taken up.
It is not a disastrous future, but it is one in which little
progress has been made to deal with the twin issues of
how to improve electricity efficiency and how to reduce
New Zealand’s carbon emissions. In this sense it is not
a sustainable future.
One of the big imponderables with the electricity sector
is pinning down future demand. For example, it is
arguable that in the process of decarbonising (or
reducing the fossil fuel intensity of ) our transport
system, we may end up using more electricity. One
technology which could hasten this outcome is
recharging electric vehicles overnight. While ‘plug-in’
technology is not currently economic, it could well
become so quite soon (Public Power Weekly, 2006). In
New Zealand, another trend of this sort is the move
towards heat pumps: while these are markedly more
energy-efficient and more climate-friendly than
alternatives such as unflued gas heaters or old-fashioned
electric resistance heaters, their rapid rise in popularity
may mean an increase in electricity load overall.
Overall conclusions
The two documents reviewed here are quite different,
and illustrate the diversity of thinking on New Zealand’s
energy future. The BCSD document is targeted at
electricity sector and policy professionals who are used
to the arcane methodology of energy projections, and
can be expected to have a fairly well developed,
technically-based view of plausible future paths for New
Zealand’s energy system. By contrast, the PCE report,
although it deals with a narrower slice of the energy
sector, namely electricity, is targeted more broadly, at
the informed general reader together with policy
professionals. It is a more accessible, user-friendly
document, less technical than the Business Council
report, but still robust.
Both documents are useful and contain a solid body of
argument. Our main criticism is of the Business Council
report, which in our view gives too little weight to the
climate change issue in its assessment, and underplays
the significance of peak oil. The full impact of the
probable ‘convergence’ described above, with climate
change and peak oil together exerting a powerful
influence on future policy development, is thus
obscured.  As pointed out in Policy Quarterly No. 2
(Piddington, 2005), it is less important to forecast the
exact timing of the peak oil phenomenon than to
embark on a transitional strategy, within a framework
of risk management. There is now a sufficient body of
evidence for us to conclude that climate change policy
instruments should be included as an essential part of
such a strategy.
In this context, we can see both studies as a contribution
to multidimensional (and multidisciplinary) analysis of
future options. They will help open up a critical dialogue
about energy, the economy, the environment and the
future of New Zealand society. The first five years of
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this century have delivered ample warning that new
approaches will be needed, and that it would be false to
rely on ‘business as usual’ and the illusion of continuity.
In a situation of discontinuity, it is certainly encouraging
to find that, both in the business sector and among
public sector advisers, there are creative minds preparing
for the inevitability of change. We can only hope that
this cross-fertilisation of ideas proceeds with a sufficient
sense of urgency.
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